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ABSTRACT
Cyberwarfare is quickly becoming the new norm in military
action. From Russia, to the United States, to China, states—as well
as non-state actors—are invested in cyber weapons and cyber
capabilities. The legal world is struggling to keep up with this
rapidly developing field and is currently engaged in the extended
discussion of whether current international humanitarian law is
sufficient to regulate the new field of cyberwarfare or whether an
entirely new system must be created. This Comment argues that
current frameworks of international humanitarian law have the
potential to regulate cyberwarfare, but they must be updated and
revised in order to effectively do so.
One major gap in international law regarding its application to
the world of cyber is in the law of targeting. Specifically, the
current regulation of the targeting of dual-use objectives, and the
current precautions that commanders must take before and during
attacks, are insufficient and must be updated in order to apply to
the cyber realm. This Comment lays out a more explicit and
revamped proportionality standard which should successfully
mandate that commanders take into account various knock-on
effects (secondary effects) when targeting a dual-use objective.
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College. I would like to thank Professor Christopher Yoo for his helpful feedback
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the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law for their editing and
revisions. All opinions expressed in this Comment are my own.
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Additionally, this Comment suggests ways to change the
precautions that a commander must take in targeting in order to
avoid punishing states for investing in technological innovation.
Finally, this Comment suggests the creation of panels of military
experts, legal experts, and cyber experts, to approve all cyber
targeting.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In today’s interconnected, heavily networked world,
cyberwarfare has become one of the most common ways that war
is waged, and its popularity and effectiveness is only growing.1
The days of battlefield standoffs between infantry and tank
brigades of opposing state armies and fighting in battles of attrition
are quickly giving way to cyberwarriors: individuals, both stateaffiliated and non-state affiliated, sitting behind a computer screen,
waging war from the comfort of their home.2 Cyberwarfare has
become particularly attractive for a number of reasons. First, it is
cheaper to wage a cyberwar than a kinetic war.3 Attacks can be
1 See Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts,
43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1011, 1012 (2010) (claiming that as of 2010
approximately 140 states had developed cyber capabilities); see also Brian J. Egan,
State Dep’t Legal Advisor, Address at UC Berkeley School of Law: International
Law and Stability in Cyberspace (Nov. 10, 2016) (“The remarkable reach of the
Internet and the ever-growing number of connections between computers and
other networked devices are delivering significant economic, social, and political
benefits to individuals and societies around the world. In addition, an increasing
number of States and non-State actors are developing the operational capability
and capacity to pursue their objectives through cyberspace.”).
2
Modern warfare is based on effects-based operations, rather than on battles
of attrition. The move from attrition-based warfare to effects-based warfare is
very important.
In an attrition framework, “the enemy is defeated by
progressively weakening its military.”
In an effects-based framework,
“operations utilise selective targeting and choice of means and methods of
warfare to achieve a desired effect.” HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBERWARFARE
AND THE LAWS OF WAR 23–24 (2012). Technological advances have also “evolved
the ability to wage war to the point where the concept of a line marking the heart
of the battle no longer makes sense; battlefields have become multidimensional
and entire countries have become the battlespace.” Id. at 22. This technology is
“easy-to-use, and capable of deployment from virtually anywhere.” Duncan B.
Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2007).
3 See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 1, at 1013.
The cost-effectiveness of
cyberwarfare is particularly attractive for weaker states or non-state actors who do
not have access to the same resources that larger, better off states have. Michael
Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues, 87 INT’L L. STUD 89, 102
(2011); see also Michael Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
885, 897 (“because of the potentially grave impact of CNA [computer network
attack] on a state’s infrastructure, it can prove a high gain, low risk option for a
state outclassed militarily or economically. Moreover, to the extent that an
opponent is militarily and economically advantaged, it is probably
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made with the click of a mouse, rather than with expensive
equipment and machinery. This helps to level the playing field
between sides with different economic resources.4 A poor state or
a non-state actor can launch a cyber-attack against a state with a
defense budget in the hundreds of billions,5 whereas in traditional
technologically-dependent, and, therefore, teeming with tempting CNA targets.”).
Non-state actors can also benefit from the “open source” nature of cyber weapons.
See Jack M. Beard, Legal Phantoms in Cyberspace: The Problematic Status of
Information as a Weapon and a Target Under International Humanitarian Law, 47
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 67, 92 (2014) (“A powerful addition to the cyber
capabilities of nonstate actors may ironically come from the arsenals of the most
technologically advanced states. Soon after powerful states use their most
sophisticated cyber weapons, the information necessary to recreate these weapons
may be readily available for downloading from the Internet.”).
4
Brian Contos, Analysis: Why Cyberwarfare is the Great Equalizer, USA TODAY
(May
30,
2013),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2013/05/30/cyberwarfaredeveloping-nations-use-of/2371687/
[https://perma.cc/9Y33-TUTT]
(“The
amount of resources and effort that a country must employ to launch a cyberattack is significantly lower than fielding tanks, launching satellites, developing a
clandestine agency or refining uranium.”); see also Hollis, supra note 2, at 1033
(cyber operations “presents . . . non-state actors new means for reaching and
affecting nation-states”). Poorer states and non-state actors also have less
possibility of being significantly harmed by a cyber-attack as “emerging and
frontier countries throughout parts of Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia are
less dependent on computers.” Id. In contrast, “[c]yberattacks present a great risk
to industrialized nations, which are highly connected and extremely dependent
on computers from the electric grid and financial services to transportation and
national defense.” Id.
5 Compare Bad Guys Can Launch Cyber-Attacks for Just $6, REUTERS (June 15,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/15/bad-guys-can-launch-cyber-attacks-forjust-6-dollars/
[https://perma.cc/K7DN-7AQG]
(describing
an
online
underground marketplace which sells access to more than 70,000 compromised
servers for only $6 per server and noting that once purchased, the compromised
servers come equipped with software to launch a variety of cyber-attacks; access
to government servers is not much more expensive at only $7 per server), and
Denis Makrushin, The Cost of Launching a DDoS Attack, SECURELIST,
https://securelist.com/the-cost-of-launching-a-ddos-attack/77784/
[https://perma.cc/QH2X-HWC8] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (stating that the cost
of launching a short attack against an online store is only $5 and that launching an
attack using a botnet of 1,000 workstations can be as low as $7 per hour), with U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER/CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, PROGRAM
ACQUISITION COST BY WEAPON SYSTEM: UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
FISCAL
YEAR
2018
BUDGET
REQUEST
(2017),
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2018/fy2
018_Weapons.pdf [https://perma.cc/344Z-UQ5S] (requesting $397.4 million for
45 combat aircraft, as well as $3.4 billion for combat vehicles).
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kinetic warfare they would most likely be overmatched. Second,
cyberwarfare is safer for the combatants involved than traditional
kinetic warfare. War can be waged from the comfort of one’s
home, rather than on a traditional battlefield.6 This entails much
less personal physical risk. Third, it is very difficult to attribute a
cyber-attack to a particular actor—state or otherwise—and
therefore it is much more difficult to be held responsible for a
cyber-attack and face the related consequences.7 Cyberwarfare is
not fought face to face, and various techniques such as IP spoofing
are available to help the attacker hide her true identity.8 Finally,
with the increasing reliance on networks and electronic
communications, the damage that can be done through cyberattacks has become truly devastating, and in many instances can be
more effective than a traditional kinetic attack.9
The rise of cyberwarfare leads to many new challenges, as
scholars, states, and militaries scramble to figure out how to
regulate this new type of technologically-advanced warfare. The
question of whether the current system of international
humanitarian law is sufficient to regulate cyberwarfare, or whether
a new regulatory system altogether is needed, is a question that is
being hotly debated.10 Two distinct camps have emerged. The first
6 See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 1, at 1014 (“unlike their counterparts in
traditional military organizations, cyber warriors operate remotely and launch
cyberattacks from within the territory of their own nation-state. The remoteness
of cyberwarfare effectively eliminates the likelihood of injury or death in a
physical encounter with forces from an opposing nation-state.”)
7 See Brenner & Clarke, supra note 1, at 1014.
8 See infra Section 2.4.
9 See HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBERWARFARE AND THE L AWS OF WAR 12–
13 (2012) (discussing the increase in digitally stored information and computerrun networks).
10 See generally Michael A. Newton, Proportionality and Precautions in Cyber
Attacks, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHANGING TECHNOLOGY
OF WAR 230 (Dan Saxon ed., 2013) (“the modern globally connected era driven by
information and interconnected civilian and military communications
infrastructures presents wholly new challenges for the lawful conduct of relations
between states.”); Eric Boylan, Note, Applying the Law of Proportionality to Cyber
Conflict: Suggestions for Practitioners, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 217, 220–21 (2017)
(“The absence of law specifically written or designed to deal with the nuances of
cyber warfare, combined with the prevalent application of other fields that are
only tangentially related, leads to a host of issues for practitioners in the realm of
cyber warfare.”).
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is made up of scholars who believe that current international law
can and should be applied to regulate cyber operations.11 This
camp can be divided into those who believe that international law
as it currently stands is sufficient, and those who believe that
certain updates must be made. The second camp is made up of
those who believe that the current legal structure cannot regulate
cyber operations—even if updated— and a completely new system
Defining “attack” in cyberwar and the
must be created.12
difficulties of state attribution create serious problems. However,
these problems are beyond the scope of this Comment.13
11 See Harold Hongju Koh, State Dep’t Legal Advisor, Remarks as Prepared
for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012)
(“This is not the first time that technology has changed and that international law
has been asked to deal with those changes. In particular, because the tools of
conflict are constantly evolving, one relevant body of law—international
humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict—affirmatively anticipates
technological innovation, and contemplates that its existing rules will apply to
such innovation.”); see also Kate Jastram & Anne Quintin, Seminar at Berkeley
Law: The Internet in Bello: Cyber War Law, Ethics & Policy (Nov. 18, 2011),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/cyberwarfareseminar-summary-complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XLC-GE5L] (“if cyber means
and methods produce the same effects as kinetic operations, they are—and should
be—governed by the same rules.”).
12 See Beard, supra note 3, at 70 (arguing that “due to the unusual properties
of information itself, there are serious problems and perils in relying on such
analogies to extend the IHL framework to most events in cyberspace.”); see also
Michael Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello, supra note 3, at 106 (“The
dilemma is that IHL was crafted during a period in which the cyber operations
were but science fiction.”).
13
The Jus in Bello regulations in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols only apply when an armed conflict occurs. Additional Protocol I
applies in situations during an international armed conflict and Additional
Protocol II applies in situations of non-international armed conflict. For the
purpose of this Comment, I assume that an international armed conflict is present
and that the cyber-attacks and operations contemplated rise to the level of an
armed attack necessary for an armed conflict to be present and to render the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I applicable. For a more in-depth
discussion of armed attack and armed conflict in cyberwarfare, see generally
David Turns, Cyber War and the Concept of ‘Attack’ in International Humanitarian
Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHANGING TECHNOLOGY OF
WAR (Dan Saxon ed., 2013); Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or Cyberwar?:
International Law, Domestic Law, and Self Protective Measures, in CYBERWAR: LAW AND
ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS (Jens David Ohlin, Kevin Govern & Claire
Finkelstein eds., 2015); Beard, supra note 3; Yoram Dinstein, The Principle of
Distinction and Cyber War in International Armed Conflicts, 17 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY
L. 261 (2012); Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information
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This Comment will argue that current international law can
effectively regulate targeting in cyberwarfare, but that significant
changes must be made in order to update it for the modern age of
warfare. The current framework of international humanitarian law
has the capability of sufficiently regulating the problem of
targeting, but it must be updated to match the realities of modern
armed conflict.14 This Comment will address two main issues
related to the law of targeting. First, cyberwarfare exacerbates the
dual-use problem that is also present in kinetic warfare. The
interconnectedness of the cyber realm leads to many more dual-use
targets—targets that serve both a civilian and a military function—
than traditional kinetic warfare. The regulation of targeting dualuse infrastructure, and the proportionality assessment that goes
along with it, must adapt for the reality that, arguably, almost any
object can serve a military purpose.15 Second, the law governing
what precautions must be taken by commanders and other officials
who are responsible for ordering attacks is insufficient in the
course of cyberwarfare. The current precautions detailed in Article
57 of Additional Protocol I create unacceptable disparities between
technologically-advanced states and non-technologically-advanced
states in the precautions they must take to determine and verify
Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023 (2007); Michael N. Schmitt,
Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or
Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511 (2005); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer
Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative
Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (1999); Noam Lubell, Lawful Targets in
Cyber Operations: Does the Principle of Distinction Apply?, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 252
(2013).
14
Note that Additional Protocol I contemplates the development of new
weapons and states that a party to the protocol must determine whether the new
weapon would be prohibited by the protocol. This suggests that the Protocol was
developed with the intention and flexibility that it be modified and updated to
keep up with advances in technology. Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. For a discussion of how Article 36 applies to
cyber weapons, see Jastram & Quintin, supra note 11 (comments by Anne Quintin,
Public Affairs Officer, International Committee of the Red Cross).
15 See Robin Geiss & Henning Lahmann, Cyberwarfare: Applying the Principal
of Distinction in an Interconnected Space, 45 ISRAEL L. REV. 381, 383 (2012) (“because
of the systemic technological setup of cyberspace in times of an armed conflict,
basically every cyber installation—possibly even cyberspace as such—potentially
qualifies as a military objective.”).
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objects of attack, and the means and methods of attack that must be
used. These imbalances are much more apparent and troublesome
in cyberwarfare than in kinetic warfare and can punish states for
technological investment. This imbalance must be corrected
through a more concrete, minimum standard of care that a
commander is required to take to ensure that the object of attack is
a military objective, and that the attack itself will not be otherwise
unlawful in the methods and means used. Additionally, due to the
technical nature of cyberwarfare, commanders should have to
receive approval of a panel made up of a lawyer, a cyber expert,
and a military commander, before launching a cyber-attack. This
should make up for the knowledge gap that military technological
innovation is bound to create.
The increased confrontation with dual-use infrastructure and
the unbalanced rules regarding precautions to be taken before an
attack leave an unacceptable amount of discretion and open-ended
analyses in the hands of commanders, who may or may not be
sufficiently trained to make important decisions in cyberwarfare.
This Comment argues that current international law has the
potential to effectively regulate cyberwarfare and military
commanders in the area of targeting but must be seriously updated
in order to do so effectively.
This Comment will proceed in four parts. Part I discusses
major types of cyber operations that have occurred in recent
history and are frequently used. Part II shifts to looking at the rise
in investment in cyberwarfare capabilities, both domestically and
internationally. Two major cyber operations, Stuxnet and the
Russia-Estonia incident of 2007 are also explained. Part III looks at
the current status of the regulation of targeting in international law
and analyzes important provisions of Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Convention. Part IV discusses two major ways in which
the current regulation of targeting falls short in the cyber context.
In this section, I suggest updates to the current regulatory
framework in order to make it more effective. Finally, I finish with
a short conclusion.
2. TYPES OF CYBER OPERATIONS
While there are many ways that states and non-state actors can
launch cyber operations in an effort to harm an opposing force,
there are four main types of cyber operations that occur today.
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This Part will briefly outline denial of service attacks, malicious
programs, logic bombs, and IP spoofing. This is not intended to be
an exhaustive detailing of all types of cyber operations, but instead
it is intended to provide sufficient background information for a
reader to understand how a cyber operation or cyber-attack could
occur, how the law of targeting is affected, and in what manner
certain updates would be beneficial.
2.1. Denial of Service (“DoS”) Attack
A Denial of Service (“DoS”) attack is an attack that bombards a
network with so many requests that access to the network or
system is severely slowed down or interrupted.16 Take, for
example, a network that receives, on average, fifty requests per
hour. Now imagine that the same network is bombarded with
thousands of requests per minute. The network then shuts down
due to an inability to handle the increased activity, and whatever
services the network offered or sites it supported, are rendered
unavailable. This can be incredibly important if governmental
services websites are shut down, or an electronic banking network
is shut down. A good analogy for a DoS attack is a doorway faced
with exponentially increased pedestrian activity. If a few people
try to enter through the doorway every minute or hour, it functions
normally, but if thousands of people suddenly try to enter over the
course of one minute, they will get stuck and will not be able to get
through. The doorway will be unable to fulfill its function of
letting people through and accessing whatever is inside. Its
normal operation is disrupted. This is a very popular form of
cyber operation as it requires very limited resources to execute. A
permutation of the traditional DoS attack is a distributed denial of
service (“DDoS”) attack.17 In a DDoS attack, many infected
computers or systems attack one network or system.18 In this
16
Ari J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under
International Law, 63 A.F. L. REV 121, 134 (2009).
17
The famous cyber-attack in 2007 on Estonia by Russia is an example of a
DDoS attack. For a more detailed description of this attack, see infra notes 58-59
and accompanying text.
18 See Schaap, supra note 16, at 134.
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situation, the requests that will eventually shut down a network
are coming from many different nodes, rather than from a single
node. A DDoS attack is tremendously difficult to stop, as blocking
one infected source of the attack will not stop the attack. The other
thousands of nodes will continue to bombard the network with
requests, even after one node is effectively neutralized.
2.2. Malicious Programs
Malicious programs (often referred to as malware) are
programs that either disrupt the normal functioning of computers
or allow remote attackers to gain control of computers and
manipulate them to disrupt their normal functioning.19 Malicious
programs often work by deleting files or corrupting them to the
point that they are unusable. Examples of malware include
viruses, worms, and Trojan horses. A virus will attach to a
program or file and in this way spread from computer to
computer. Viruses are attached to an executable file, meaning that
it will only begin to infect a computer when a user opens or runs
the malicious program.20 In this way, a virus may exist on a
computer but remain dormant until a user activates the virus by
opening or running the program. A worm is similar to a virus but
can travel without being activated by a user. It can replicate itself
without the infected program or file even being opened.21 A Trojan
Horse is a harmful piece of software that is disguised as something
that looks legitimate but in fact is just a piece of malware.22 A user
is then tricked by the appearance of legitimacy into opening the
program and activating the malicious program. Unlike viruses and
worms, Trojan Horses do not spread through infecting files or
through self-replication.23 They need to be opened or downloaded
in order to work.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 136.
21 What is the Difference: Viruses, Worms, Trojans, and Bots?, CISCO,
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/virus-differences.html
[https://perma.cc/992M-LDV5] (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
22 Id.
23 Id.
19
20
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2.3. Logic Bombs
A logic bomb is a malicious code that will execute its
programmed task if a specific event occurs at a predetermined
time.24 Examples of events that would trigger a logic bomb could
be a certain time or date, a specific file being deleted, or a pre-set
amount of disk space being filled.25 When the specific event occurs
and the logic bomb is triggered, the logic bomb can perform a
variety of different actions including deleting data or activating a
DoS attack.26 Imagine a disgruntled employee who creates a
malicious code to self-execute in the event that the employee is
fired. An example of the actual use of a logic bomb is a cyberattack that struck computers at three banks and two media
companies in South Korea in March 2013. The specified triggering
event was a certain time and date, and once this specific time and
date was reached, malware began to delete data from the
computers.27
2.4. IP Spoofing
IP spoofing occurs when an attacker impersonates a different
machine by faking the IP address of a trusted source and then uses
this fake IP address to gain access to a machine or network.28 The
fake IP address then conceals the identity of the attacker or sender
and makes it seem as if the information or virus being sent is
coming from a trusted source or even from a machine within the
receiver’s network. IP spoofing is one of the most used methods of
See Schaap, supra note 16, at 137.
Stephen Northcutt, Logic Bombs, Trojan Horses, and Trap Doors, SECURITY
LABORATORY,
https://www.sans.edu/cyber-research/securitylaboratory/article/log-bmb-trp-door
[https://perma.cc/6HZP-UAFP]
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2018).
26 See Schaap, supra note 16, at 137.
27
Kim Zetter, Logic Bomb Set Off South Korea Cyberattack, WIRED (Mar. 21,
2013),
https://www.wired.com/2013/03/logic-bomb-south-korea-attack/
[https://perma.cc/CKN3-2DL8].
28
What is IP Spoofing? IP LOCATION, https://www.iplocation.net/ipspoofing [https://perma.cc/L2VZ-8AHY] (last accessed Feb. 25, 2018).
24
25
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carrying out an illicit cyber operation. By engaging in IP spoofing,
an attacker can make it very difficult for an attack to be attributed
to him.
3. EXAMPLES OF CYBER OPERATIONS AROUND THE WORLD
Over recent years, cyber operations29 have become a very
popular way of waging warfare throughout the world.30 Across
the globe, state, as well as non-state actors, have begun to invest
29
Terminology is important in the cyber context. Although the definitions
of cyber operation and cyber-attack are hotly debated, and no one definition has
been settled on, a useful starting place are the definitions offered by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 2011. In a memorandum, they state that a cyber operation is “the
employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve
military objectives or effects in or through cyber space.” Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military
Services Commanders of the Combatant Commands Directors of the Joint Staff
Directorates: Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations (2011). A cyber-attack
is defined as “A hostile act using computer or related networks or systems, and
intended to disrupt and/or destroy an adversary’s critical cyber systems, assets,
or functions.” Id. Cyberwarfare is defined as “An armed conflict conducted in
whole or part by cyber means. Military operations conducted to deny an
opposing force the effective use of cyberspace systems and weapons in a conflict.
It includes cyber-attack, cyber defense, and cyber enabling actions.” Id. The
Tallinn Manual defines a cyber-attack as “a cyber operation, whether offensive or
defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or
damage or destruction to objects.” TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. It is important to note in these definitions that cyber
operations are a broader category that is inclusive of cyber-attacks. Michael N.
Schmitt argues that “A cyber operation, like any other operation, is an attack
when resulting in death or injury of individuals, whether civilians or combatants,
or damage to or destruction of objects, whether military objectives or civilian
objects.” Michael Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello, supra note 3, at 94.
For a more in-depth discussion of definitions and terminology in the cyber
context, see Oona A. Hathaway & Rebecca Crootof, The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100
CAL. L. REV. 817, 817 (2012) (examining cyber operations within the existing
framework provided by the law of war, international treaties, and domestic
criminal law); Daniel Hughes & Andrew Colarik, The Hierarchy of Cyber War
Definitions, in PACIFIC-ASIA WORKSHOP ON INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY INFORMATICS
15 (2017) (analyzing the origins and patterns of usage of cyber terminology across
over one hundred documents). For a more detailed discussion of what actions
rise to the level of a cyber-attack, see supra note 13.
30 See supra notes 2–9.
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heavily in creating cyber capabilities, both offensive and defensive.
As of 2013, more than 140 countries had some form of funded
cyber development program.31 While many states have developed
cyber capabilities, a few states have been leaders in technological
development, innovation, and use in this field. This Part will look
at cyber operations and investment in cyber capabilities of China,
North Korea, Russia, and the United States.
3.1. China
China has stated that its goal is to “achieve global ‘electronic
dominance’ by 2050.” This would enable it to target the financial
markets,
military,
critical
infrastructure
and
civilian
32
communications of other countries through cyber means. China
is also extremely vulnerable to a cyber-attack since it has the
world’s largest internet using population. Therefore, it has also
decided to invest significant funds in cyber defense. Over the last
fifteen years, China has engaged in a number of cyber operations
such as “Titan Rain”33, “Aurora”34, “Night Dragon”35 and “Shady
Rat”36. Importantly, in 2015 China established the Strategic
31
Peter Suciu, Why Cyber Warfare is So Attractive to Small Nations, FORTUNE
(Dec. 21, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/12/21/why-cyber-warfare-is-soattractive-to-small-nations/ [https://perma.cc/5L26-6DCU].
32
ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY
ASSESSMENTS, CYBER WARFARE: A “NUCLEAR OPTION”? 27 (2012).
33
Titan Rain was a campaign of coordinated attacks originating in china and
beginning in 2003 in which the hackers targeted American defense contractor
computer networks in order to extract sensitive information. It is disputed as to
whether the attacks were an initiative of the Chinese government or were
committed by individual Chinese citizens. Id at 31–32.
34
Aurora was a cyber-attack occurring in 2009 in which a computer attack
originating in China was able to penetrate Google, as well as other companies and
organizations, and steal information. Id at 35–37.
35
Night Dragon was a set of coordinated cyber-attacks aimed against global
oil and energy companies. William Pentland, Night Dragon Attacks Target
(Feb.
19,
2011),
Technology
in
Energy
Industry,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/02/19/night-dragonattacks-target-technology-in-energy-industry/#409e066c1d49
[https://perma.cc/4U7Q-VPQH].
36
Shady Rat was an operation, also occurring around 2009, targeting
fourteen different countries through spear phishing that included an email with
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Support Force (SSF) which guides its space and cyber missions.37
The SSF has been described as an organization that “uniquely
conducts several different missions simultaneously that in the U.S.
would be happening at the National Security Agency, Army, Air
Force, Department of Homeland Security, NASA, State
Department and Cyber Command . . . . If you combined all of
those government entities and added companies like Intel, Boeing
and Google to the mix, then you would come close to how the SSF
is built to operate.”38 The creation of the SSF is part of a strategy to
catch up to the U.S. in cyber capabilities. In an effort to catch up,
“China is improving training and domestic innovation to achieve
its cyber capability development goals. PLA [People’s Liberation
Army] researchers advocate seizing ‘cyberspace superiority’ by
using cyber operations to deter or degrade an adversary’s ability to
conduct military operations against China.”39 The U.S. Department
of Defense warns that “the PLA may seek to use its cyberwarfare
capabilities to collect data for intelligence and cyber-attack
purposes; to constrain an adversary’s actions by targeting networkbased logistics, communications, and commercial activities; or to
serve as a force-multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks
during times of crisis or conflict.”40 China is a country with a
history of cyber operations, that has made a commitment to
expanding its future cyber capabilities.

malware. Information obtained through this attack included “national secrets,
source code, databases and SCADA configurations.” See KREPINEVICH, supra note
32, at 34–35.
37
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 34 (2017),
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Po
wer_Report.PDF [https://perma.cc/9DCB-7DME]. Elsa Kania, a U.S. national
security analyst, stated that while it is difficult to determine the budget or
manpower of the SSF, she anticipated that both are sizable. See Chris Bing, How
China’s Cyber Command is Being Built to Supersede its U.S. Military Counterpart,
CYBERSCOOP (June 22, 2017), https://www.cyberscoop.com/china-ssf-cybercommand-strategic-support-force-pla-nsa-dod [https://perma.cc/4MHM-9SQS]
(“I would anticipate that both will be sizable — given the SSF’s apparent scope
and scale, as well as the importance of these missions”).
38 See Bing, supra note 37.
39 Id. at 51.
40 Id. at 59.
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3.2. North Korea
North Korea is another country that has focused heavily on
building cyber capabilities over recent years. Much of North
Korea’s cyber program was developed when Kim Jung Un came to
power after his father’s death in 2011.41 The centerpiece of the
North Korean cyber program is Bureau 121, an elite cyber unit
comprised of North Korean Hackers.42 In 2014, Bureau 121 entered
the international spotlight following a cyber operation on
computers at Sony Pictures Entertainment. Allegedly this hacking
was in response to Sony’s release of “The Interview,” a comedy
about an assassination attempt on Kim Jung Un.43 While the North
Koreans have denied a role in this attack, overwhelming evidence
points to their involvement.44 In addition to hacks against
41
David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick & Nicole Perlroth, The World Once
Laughed at North Korean Cyberpower. No More., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/asia/north-korea-hacking-cybersony.html [https://perma.cc/2BVZ-JD6A].
42 See Dave Lee, Bureau 121: How Good Are Kim Jong-Un’s Elite Hackers?, BBC
NEWS (May 29, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32925503
[https://perma.cc/F6W5-FZWY] (reporting on North Korea’s elite hackers). The
best computer science students in North Korea are chosen for this unit and are
given additional training in countries such as China, Japan, or various European
countries. Id. It is estimated that approximately 1,800 hackers make up this elite
unit. See Ju-Min Park & James Pearson, In North Korea, Hackers Are a Handpicked,
Pampered Elite, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sonycybersecurity-northkorea/in-north-korea-hackers-are-a-handpicked-pamperedelite-idUSKCN0JJ08B20141205 [https://perma.cc/C4N7-SVU5]. Many of these
hackers learned their computer skills in New York universities while working for
North Korean missions to the United Nations. Sanger, Kirkpatrick & Perlroth,
supra note 41.
43 See David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Said to Find North Korea Ordered
Cyberattack
on
Sony,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
17,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/asia/us-links-north-korea-tosony-hacking.html [https://perma.cc/8EE8-5CJ7S]. The attack caused the four
largest movie theater chains in the U.S. to cancel showings of the movie. Id.
44 See Press Release, FBI National Press Office, Update on Sony Investigation
(Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/update-onsony-investigation [https://perma.cc/BSW8-9WHW]
(“As a result of our
investigation, and in close collaboration with other U.S. government departments
and agencies, the FBI now has enough information to conclude that the North
Korean government is responsible for these actions.”); see also Sam Frizell, NSA
Director on Sony Hack: “The Entire World is Watching”, TIME (Jan. 9, 2015),
http://time.com/3660757/nsa-michael-rogers-sony-hack/
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America, North Korea has allegedly committed cyber-attacks
against South Korea, both in a series of DDoS attacks from 2009–
2011 and then again in 2013 with cyber-attacks targeting banking,
media, and governmental targets in South Korea.45 Recently, the
U.S., along with a number of other countries, accused North Korea
of being behind the WannaCry ransomware attack.46 This attack
targeted computers running the Microsoft Windows operating
system and affected computers in over 150 countries. In 2016
General Vincent Brooks, Commander of U.S. forces in South Korea,
told Senate leaders “While I would not characterize them [North
Korea] as the best in the world, they are among the best in the
world and the best organized.”47 North Korea is a good example of
a relatively poor country seeking to level the playing field through
the use of more cost-effective cyber-attacks.48 Cyber weapons are
[https://perma.cc/9DGS-EJ4J] (quoting NSA Director Michael Rogers, “I remain
very confident: this was North Korea.”). Some analysts and journalists argue that
North Korea might not have been responsible for the attack. See, e.g., Michael
Hitzik, The Sony Hack: What if it isn’t North Korea?, L.A. TIMES, (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mh-the-sony-hack-20141219column.html [https://perma.cc/R298-8SQZ ] (detailing the concerns of some
security experts regarding North Korean involvement).
45
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 11 (2013),
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a596219.pdf [https://perma.cc/93UA93X3].
46 See Thomas P. Bossert, It’s Official: North Korea is Behind WannaCry, WALL
STREET J. (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/its-official-north-koreais-behind-wannacry-1513642537 [https://perma.cc/H6XK-KZ23] (stating that the
United Kingdom also agrees that North Korea is behind the attack); see also White
House Says WannaCry Attack Was Carried Out by North Korea, CBS NEWS (Dec. 19,
2017) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/white-house-says-wannacry-attack-wascarried-out-by-north-korea/ [https://perma.cc/2ENC-8HW4 ] (noting that
Canada, New Zealand and Japan also agree that North Korea is behind the
attack).
47
Paul Szoldra, A US Army General Says North Korea Has Some of the World’s
Best
Hackers,
BUS.
INSIDER
(May
10,
2016),
http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-worlds-best-hackers-2016-5
[https://perma.cc/8QKC-QGEG ].
48
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2013),
supra note 45, at 11; see also KREPINEVICH, supra note 32, at 76–77 (“What may prove
significant is North Korea’s ability to execute a fairly sophisticated cyber-attack
despite its status as one of the world’s most backward nations, especially when it
comes to its IT infrastructure and the IT literacy of the vast majority of its people);
Sanger, Kirkpatrick & Perlroth, supra note 41 (quoting Chris Inglis, a former
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far less expensive for the relatively poor country to develop and
since North Korea does not have very technologically-advanced
infrastructure, it leaves them less open to a cyber-attack than a
more developed nation. North Korea’s cyber program has grown
tremendously over the last decade, and experts expect it to
continue to grow.49
3.3. Russia
Russia has arguably the most sophisticated cyber capabilities of
any nation. Professor James Wirtz of the Department of National
Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School has stated,
“Russia, more than any other nascent actor on the cyber stage,
seems to have devised a way to integrate cyberwarfare into a grand
strategy capable of achieving political objectives.”50 In 2014, the
Russian government announced that it was going to create a
special military cyber unit which would be responsible for both
offensive and defensive operations. The original budget for this
unit was to be approximately $70 million and was to be completed
by 2017.51 Much of Russia’s governmental cyber capabilities are
intertwined with the cyber capabilities of the Russian Business
Network (RBN),52 a non-governmental criminal group based in St.

deputy director of the NSA, “Cyber is a tailor-made instrument of power for
them . . . . There’s a low cost of entry, it’s largely asymmetrical, there’s some
degree of anonymity and stealth in it’s use . . . . You could argue that they have
one of the most successful cyber programs on the planet, not because it’s
technically sophisticated, but because it has achieved all of their aims at very low
cost.”).
49 See Sanger, Kirkpatrick & Perlroth, supra note 41.
50
James J. Wirtz, Cyber War and Strategic Culture: The Russian Integration of
Cyber Power into Grand Strategy, in CYBER WAR IN PERSPECTIVE: RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
AGAINST UKRAINE (Kenneth Geers ed., 2015).
51
MICHAEL CONNELL & SARAH VOGLER, CNA ANALYSIS & SOLUTIONS, RUSSIA’S
APPROACH
TO
CYBER
WARFARE
8
(2017),
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U-014231-1Rev.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FET9-USBW].
52
It is unclear exactly what connection the Russian government has to the
RBN and what influence they have. See John Markoff, Before the Gunfire,
Cyberattacks,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
12,
2008),
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Petersburg. Russia has been accused of using cyber-attacks
alongside more traditional kinetic attacks.53 In its invasion of
Georgia in the summer of 2008, Russia allegedly aided and
complemented their ground invasion of Georgia with a series of
DoS attacks designed to take down Georgian networks and
websites.54 These DoS attacks often coincided with Russian air
strikes, strengthening the case that the cyber-attacks were
government sponsored attacks designed to aid in the overall
campaign.55 Russia has also used cyber operations to coerce other
states into taking certain actions that would benefit them. In 2009,
Russia launched a series of DDoS attacks against Kyrgyzstan,
taking down websites and email accounts throughout the
country.56 The attacks coincided with the Russian pressure on
Kyrgyzstan to terminate U.S. access to an airbase at Manas, a city
in Kyrgyzstan. The U.S. had been using the airbase to aid in its
military efforts in Afghanistan. Shortly after these DDoS attacks,
Kyrgyzstan ended U.S. use of the airbase.57 One of the earliest, and
most famous, large scale cyber operations was Russia’s DoS attacks
in Estonia in 2007. In 2007, Estonian officials moved a Soviet-era
memorial that celebrated an unknown Russian who died while
fighting against the Nazi’s in World War II from Central Tallinn to
a cemetery on the outskirts of the city.58 This led to violent, deadly
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html
[https://perma.cc/GE5A-ZBLA].
53
Russia uses cyber operations as a “multiplier, which is a military term that
describes a weapon or tactic that, when added to and employed along with other
combat forces, significantly increases the combat potential of that force.” See
Schaap, supra note 16, at 133.
54
The DoS attacks succeeded in taking down important government
websites and disrupting government communications. See CONNELL & VOGLER,
supra note 51, at 17.
55 See id. at 53–54.
While Georgia accuses the Russian government of
carrying out these operations, the Russian government denies this. See Markoff,
supra note 52.
56 Id. at 55.
57 Id. at 56.
58 See David Weissbrodt, Cyber-Conflict, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Espionage, 22
MINN. J. INT’L L. 347, 349 (2013). The attack coincided with the date that Russia
celebrates Victory in Europe Day. See Emily Tamkin, 10 Years After the Landmark
Attack on Estonia, Is the World Better Prepared for Cyber Threats?, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Apr. 27, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/27/10-years-after-the-
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protests, and then to a series of DDoS attacks against Estonian
government websites. The volume of the attacks caused the
websites to shut down for hours at a time over the course of
weeks.59 Eventually NATO and the U.S. sent cyber experts to try to
help Estonia. Estonia has blamed Russia for the attack, but Russia
has never taken responsibility. Russia has also used cyber
operations in order to achieve intended kinetic effects. In 2015,
Russia attacked Ukraine’s power grid through coordinated cyber
operations. They attacked three distribution centers of a Ukrainian
power company in Western Ukraine.60 This caused major power
outages throughout the country. Perhaps Russia’s most famous
cyber operations, though, have been its alleged attempts to
influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election.61
3.4. United States of America
The U.S. also places great importance on developing cyber
capabilities, both offensive and defensive. In 2015 the Department
of Defense listed three primary missions in cyberspace. The first is
to “defend its own networks, systems, and information.”62 The
landmark-attack-on-estonia-is-the-world-better-prepared-for-cyber-threats/
[https://perma.cc/L34E-NU2X].
59 Id. at 350. Online bank accounts and newspapers also became inaccessible
during the attacks. See Tamkin, supra note 58.
60 See CONNELL & VOGLER, supra note 51, at 20–21.
61 See Ellen Nakashima, Cybersecurity Firm Finds Evidence that Russian Military
Unit
was
Behind
DNC
Hack
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
22,
2016)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cybersecurity-firmfinds-a-link-between-dnc-hack-and-ukrainian-artillery/2016/12/21/47bf1f5ac7e3-11e6-bf4b-2c064d32a4bf_story.html?utm_term=.07a72e343410
[https://perma.cc/8ASS-VB5H] (providing evidence showing Russia’s
involvement with the hack of the Democratic National Committee); Adam Entous
and Ellen Nakashima, FBI in Agreement with CIA that Russia Aimed to Help Trump
Win
White
House,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
16,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/clinton-blames-putins-personalgrudge-against-her-for-election-interference/2016/12/16/12f36250-c3be-11e68422-eac61c0ef74d_story.html?utm_term=.8a7a37bec6a2
[https://perma.cc/XG8B-KP48] (detailing FBI and CIA assessments of Russia’s
involvement in the 2016 election).
62
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
DEFENSE,
CYBER
STRATEGY
4
(2015),
http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-
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second is to “defend the United States and its interests against
This includes
cyber-attacks of significant consequence.”63
conducting cyber operations to counter an attack against the U.S.
or U.S. interests. The third mission is that DoD “must be able to
provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations
and contingency plans.”64 The DoD includes a special Cyber
Mission Force (CMF) to help the DoD carry out its cyber mission.
The CMF is made up of 6,200 people, including members of the
military, civilians, and contractors. Once fully completed and
operational, the CMF will be composed of 133 teams, each with its
own mission.65
The U.S. has identified a number of key cyber threats which it
must protect against. These include countries such as Russia,
China, North Korea, and Iran, as well as non-state actors such as
ISIL and various criminal actors.66
DoD’s budget reflects the growing importance it places on
developing cyber capabilities. In the budget request for 2017,
Defense Secretary Ash Carter requested $6.7 billion for a cyber
budget, a 15% increase over the previous year.67 Over the course of
2017-2021, the budget would call for $34.6 billion to be spent on
cyber capabilities. Included in this budget are funds to support
training,
weapons
development,
deterrence
capabilities,
capabilities to disrupt incoming attacks, offensive capabilities, as
well as funds to support research and development.68

strategy/final_2015_dod_cyber_strategy_for_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KJVM9MB].
63 Id. at 5.
64 Id. at 5–6.
65 Id. at 6–8. As of June 2016, 46 of the 133 teams were fully operational. See
also William Matthews, Unpacking DoD’s Cyber Strategy and $6.7B Spending Plan,
GOVTECH WORKS (Jul. 13, 2016), https://www.govtechworks.com/unpackingdods-cyber-strategy-and-6-7b-spending-plan/ [https://perma.cc/RC5B-3PE3].
66 Id. at 8.
67
Matthews, supra note 65.
68
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Submitted Statement to the Senate
Armed Services Committee on the FY 2017 Budget Request for the Department of
Defense
(Mar.
17,
2016),
at
23–24,
https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Carter_03-17-16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2Z4M-ULWS].
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Importantly, in 2017 the DoD initiated a process to elevate U.S.
Cyber Command to a unified combatant command.69 President
Trump stated that “[t]his new combatant command will strengthen
our cyberspace operations and create more opportunities to
improve our nation’s defense.”70 The Cyber Command, led by the
NSA director, was established in 2009 and is currently a
subordinate Unified Combatant Command of U.S. Strategic
Command. The Cyber Command “plans, coordinates, integrates,
synchronizes and conducts activities to: direct the operations and
defense of specified Department of Defense information networks
and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military
cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains,
ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the
same to our adversaries.”71
The United States, along with Israel, launched perhaps the
most infamous cyber-attack to date, Stuxnet. Stuxnet was a joint
project between the U.S. and Israel to disrupt the Iranian nuclear
program, initiated under the code name “Olympic Games” in
2006.72 In 2010 it reached a computer through an employee flash
drive in an underground Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz.73 The
virus took the form of a worm that suddenly sped up and slowed
69
The other Unified Combatant Commands are United States Africa
Command (USAFRICOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM),
United States European Command (USEUCOM), United States Northern
Command (USNORTHCOM), United States Pacific Command (USPACOM),
United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM), United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), and United States Transportation Command. The most recently
created was USAFRICOM in 2007. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., UNIFIED COMMAND
PLAN,
https://www.defense.gov/About/Military-Departments/UnifiedCombatant-Commands/ [https://perma.cc/6E9S-KZTE] (showing the list of
unified combatant commands).
70
Jim Garamone & Lisa Ferdinandi, DoD Initiates Process to Elevate U.S. Cyber
Command to Unified Combatant Command, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1283326/dod-initiates-processto-elevate-us-cyber-command-to-unified-combatant-command/
[https://perma.cc/EP93-P2N5].
71
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. CYBER COMMAND FACT SHEET (May 25, 2010),
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-038.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3L4H-9M4N] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
72
Weissbrodt, supra note 58, at 351.
73 Id.
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down the centrifuges being used to enrich uranium, causing the
centrifuges to break. Even though the centrifuge speed was
rapidly changing, the worm was designed in such a way that the
monitoring computers showed that the centrifuges were
functioning at a normal speed.74 Eventually there was an error in
the program that allowed the worm to spread, and it infected over
100,000 computers worldwide. The worm did prove to be effective
though, and some claim that it set the Iranian nuclear program
back by approximately 18 months.75
4. CURRENT REGULATION OF THE LAW OF TARGETING
The law of targeting, and the principle of distinction, which
calls for the distinction between combatants and military objectives
on the one hand, and civilians and civilian objects on the other
hand, is thought of as one of the most important, if not the most
important principal in international humanitarian law.76 The
principle was first stated in the preamble to the 1868 St. Petersburg
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight: “The only legitimate
object, which States should endeavor to accomplish during war, is

Id.
Id. at 352.
76 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 257 (July 8) (“The cardinal principles contained in the texts
constituting the fabric of humanitarian law are the following. The first is aimed at
the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the
distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States must never make
civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.”); Elizabeth
Mavropoulou, Targeting in the Cyber Domain: Legal Challenges Arising From the
Application of the Principle of Distinction to Cyber Attacks, 4 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 37
(2015) (“the principle of distinction forms the cornerstone on which international
humanitarian law stands.”); Alexandre Cabral Campelo Hierro Lopes, Conduct of
Hostilities: Precautions in Attack (2015) (unpublished master’s dissertation,
Universidade
Catolica
Portuguesa),
https://repositorio.ucp.pt/bitstream/10400.14/20456/4/Conduct%20of%20Hosti
lities.pdf [https://perma.cc/N964-X6U6] (“The Principle of Distinction is one of
the most important rules of IHL, having the responsibility of avoiding or at least
reducing nasty consequences of war for the civilian population.”).
74
75
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to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”77 It was further
refined in the Hague Convention of 1899, revised in 1907,
forbidding parties “[t]o employ arms, projectiles, or material
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”78
Today, the principle of distinction, and the other laws
regulating targeting in international armed conflicts are located in
Part IV of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which
specifically deals with the treatment of civilians.79
Article 48 articulates the basic rule of respect for civilians and
civilian objects, stating that “the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.”80
Article 51 deals specifically with the civilian population and
states that civilians should not be made the object of attack unless
they directly participate in the hostilities.81 Additionally, Article 51
prohibits indiscriminate attacks, which are attacks that (a) are not
directed at a specific military objective, (b) employ a means or
method which cannot be directed at a specific military objective, or
(c) employ a means or method that are of a nature to strike civilian
objects and military objectives without distinction.82 Perhaps most
importantly for the purposes of this Comment, Article 51 contains
the principle of proportionality. It states that, “an attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
77
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 298.
78
Conventions Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
79
Additional Protocol I, supra note 14. 173 out of 193 states are party to this
Protocol. Although certain notable states are not party to Additional Protocol I,
they are still bound to follow the provisions as they are now reflective of
customary international law. See Michael N. Schmitt & Eric W. Widmar, “On
Target”: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 379, 381 (2014) (Dispelling the notion that IHL targeting law is
inapplicable in cases where a non-signatory state is involved, because Additional
Protocol I is generally regarded as customary international law).
80
Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 48.
81 See id. art. 51(1)–(3).
82 Id. art. 51(4).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss3/5

2019] Updating the Law of Targeting for an Era of Cyberwarfare

759

which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated” is illegal and violates international
law.83
Article 52 importantly states that civilian objects should not be
attacked, and then defines a military objective as, “limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling
at the time, offer a definite military advantage.”84 Additionally,
Article 52 states that in the case of doubt as to whether an objective
is being used for military or civilian purposes, it should be
presumed to be civilian.85
Article 54 calls for the protection of objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population.86
Finally, Article 57 details precautions that commanders must
take in planning and carrying out an attack.87 This Article calls for
those who plan or decided upon an attack to (i) do everything
feasible to determine that the objects or population under attack is
civilian, and (ii) to take feasible precautions in choosing the means
and methods of attack to minimize collateral damage.88 Article 57
goes on to state that the duty to take precautions is an ongoing
duty and an attack should be canceled if it becomes apparent that
the target is not military or if the attack is expected to cause
excessive collateral damage. Finally, Article 57 states that when
Id. art. 51(5)(b).
Id. art. 52(2). Article 52(2) lists four ways that an objective could become
military. The commentary to Additional Protocol I discusses these ways further.
Nature “refers to objects which, by their ‘nature,’ make an effective contribution to
military action.” INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 636
(Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987)
[hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I]. Location refers to objects that
don’t have a military function, but contribute to military action based solely on
where they are located. Id. Purpose refers to the intended future use of the object.
Id. This is differentiated from use which refers to the current use of the object. Id.
Civilian object is defined in the negative, as “civilian objects are all objects which
are not military objectives.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 52(1).
85
Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 52(3).
86 Id. art. 54.
87 Id. art. 57.
88 Id. art. 57(2).
83
84

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

760

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:3

there is a choice between targeting military objectives that will
provide a similar military advantage, the commander should
choose to target the objective that will cause the least danger to
civilians and civilian objects.89 While these Articles are designed to
regulate traditional kinetic warfare, this Comment will argue that
they do have the potential to also effectively regulate cyberwarfare,
subject to updates in two important areas that will be detailed in
Part IV.
5. THE LAW OF TARGETING IN CYBERWARFARE
This Part will focus on the main theme of this Comment: that
the current international law regulating targeting in cyberwarfare
is insufficient and must be updated in order to regulate modern
cyberwarfare. So far, the most extensive work on regulating
cyberwarfare has been the Tallinn Manual. This project started in
2009 when the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of
Excellence (“NATO CCD COE”), based in Tallinn, Estonia, invited
an independent group of international law experts to create a
manual on regulating cyberwarfare.90
In 2013, this group
published the first edition of the Tallinn Manual, which focused
exclusively on cyber operations occurring in the context of armed
conflicts. In 2017, the group of experts published the second
edition of the Tallinn Manual (“Tallinn Manual 2.0”) which
supersedes the first edition and also discusses international law
relating to cyber operations during peacetime.91 The Tallinn
Manual is not binding, nor does it represent the opinion of any
state or international organization. It is intended to be “an
objective restatement of the lex lata.”92 In writing the Tallinn
Manual, the experts acted under the presumption that existing
international law could be applied to cyber operations and saw
their task as determining how existing international law applies in

89
90
91
92

Id. art. 57(3).
See generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 29.
Id. at 3.
Id.
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the cyber context.93 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 is made of 154 rules,
and accompanying commentary in the categories of (1) General
International Law and Cyberspace, (2) Specialized Regimes of
International Law and Cyberspace, (3) International Peace and
Security and Cyber Activities and (4) The Law of Cyber Armed
Conflict. This Comment recognizes much of the work of the
Tallinn Manual as a good starting point and relies on a similar
method of attempting to update existing international law for
cyberwarfare, rather than developing a new system altogether.
This Comment will discuss two different areas that must be
updated. Section 5.1 will discuss the targeting of dual-use
objectives and will focus on the problems caused by the increased
confrontation with dual-use objectives in cyberwarfare, as
compared with traditional kinetic warfare. Section 5.2 will argue
that the rules regulating the precautions a commander must take
before launching an attack, and while the attack is occurring, are
insufficient for cyberwarfare. This Section will argue that the
current regulation encourages a race to the bottom and places an
unfair burden on states and non-state actors that choose to invest
in technological advancement. In each case, this Comment argues
that while the general framework of international humanitarian
law, and specifically Additional Protocol I, has the potential to
effectively regulate targeting in cyberwarfare, certain updates and
modifications must be made to the Articles of Additional Protocol I
in order to properly do so.
5.1. Targeting Dual-Use Infrastructure in Cyberwarfare
The regulation targeting the dual-use objectives must be
updated for cyberwarfare in order to take into account knock-on
effects in the proportionality assessment, and to give commanders
enough explicit guidance to determine whether their cyber-attacks
pass the proportionality analysis.

93

Id.
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5.1.1. The Exacerbation of the Dual-Use Problem in Cyberwarfare
While dual-use objects and infrastructure are present in
traditional kinetic warfare, they are far more prevalent in
cyberwarfare.94 This is due to the increasing importance of the
Internet, computer networks, and cyberspace in the 21st century.
Often the military uses civilian networks for communications
purposes.95 In fact, it is estimated that 98% of government
communications travel through civilian networks and lines.96
Additionally, the military relies heavily on civilian providers for
military computer software and hardware, as well as related
services and maintenance.97 The military information being sent
over civilian lines and civilian networks includes, presumably,
classified orders, instructions for carrying out military operations,
and intelligence reports, all of which would be categorized as
military objectives.98
While Additional Protocol I does not
explicitly mention dual-use objects in its definition of military

94 See Henry Shue & David Wippman, Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use Facilities
Performing Indispensable Civilian Functions, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 559 (2002) (“as
technologically developed societies become ever more dependent on the
uninterrupted functioning of basic infrastructure for the satisfaction of both
civilian and military needs, the problems posed by attacks on such infrastructure
will only increase.”).
95 See Jastram & Quintin, supra note 11, at 3 (“Cyber space is characterized by
interconnectivity. According to a recent Department of Defense report, DOD
employees operate 15,000 computer networks with 7 million computers at
hundreds of locations around the world. Nearly all military cyber infrastructure
relies on civilian networks.”).
96 See Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of
Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1533 (2010); see also Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected
Consequences From Knock-On Effects: A Different Standard For Computer Network
Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1145, 1158–59 (2003) (“unless an attack
originates on a Department of Defense (“DOD”) computer and travels solely over
military communications equipment to an enemy’s military communications
network, it will at some point be conducted by some medium that is civilian in
nature and therefore, involve civilian objects.”).
97
Jensen, Cyber Warfare, supra note 96, at 1533.
98 Id. at 1542.
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objectives, it is well established that if an object has both a civilian
and a military use, it should be considered a military objective.99
The integration of civilian and military networks could
potentially render almost any civilian object military.100 Just
because a dual-use object is categorized as a military objective,
however, does not necessarily mean that it can be attacked. It is
still subject to a proportionality analysis which weighs harm to the
civilian population against the expected military advantage to be
gained. Specifically, the proportionality principle is stated as a
prohibition on “an attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
If the harm to the civilian population is
anticipated.”101
disproportionate to the expected military advantage, the attack is
unlawful, regardless of whether or not the attack is against a
military objective.102 While the proportionality assessment does
reign in the potential for attacks on dual-use infrastructure, a more
explicit and inclusive proportionality analysis is needed in the
cyber context.
The current proportionality assessment as
expressed in Article 51(5)(b) is too heavily dependent on the
subjective analysis of a specific commander.103 It also is not
99 See Geiss & Lahmann, supra note 15, at 389 (the general view appears to be
that any military use, however minimal, would render a civilian object a military
objective).
100 Id., at 389 (“It follows that in a future ‘cyber war’ the established
definition of military objectives, despite striking an accepted balance between
military needs for flexibility and civilian protection in traditional armed conflicts,
could render basically every component of the cyber infrastructure a legitimate
military objective”). Specific examples of traditionally civilian objects that may
fall into the dual-use category in cyberwarfare include “computer networks of
certain research facilities, air traffic control networks that regulate both civilian
and military aircraft, computerized civilian logistics systems upon which military
supplies will be moved, electronic power grid control networks, communications
nodes and systems, including satellite and other space-based systems, railroad
and other transportation systems, civilian government networks, and oil and gas
distribution systems.” See Jensen, Unexpected Consequences, supra note 96, at 1159–
60.
101
Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 51(5)(b).
102 See Schaap, supra note 16, at 157.
103 See Lopes, supra note 76 (“Its [the proportionality assessment’s] practical
application is however very difficult for the concepts that form this principle . . .
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structured to sufficiently take into account knock-on effects, which
can be difficult to predict.
5.1.2. Attempts by the Tallinn Manual Experts to Regulate the
Targeting of Dual-Use Objectives
The Tallinn Manual attempts to regulate the targeting of dualuse objects, and states in rule 101 that “[c]yber infrastructure used
for both civilian and military purposes is a military objective.”104
In this way it mirrors Article 52 of Additional Protocol I. In the
commentary to rule 101, the Tallinn Manual states that “[t]his
principle confirms that all dual-use objects and facilities are
military objectives, without qualification.”105 The Tallinn Manual
contemplates the unique challenges that dual-use objectives pose
in cyberwarfare, describing a network that is used for both civilian
and military purposes.106 Unlike in traditional kinetic warfare, it
may be impossible to differentiate which part of the network will
carry military transmissions. The Tallinn Manual states that “in
such cases, the entire network (or at least those aspects in which
transmission is reasonably likely) qualifies as a military
objective.”107 Therefore, as long as it passes the proportionality
analysis, it could legitimately be attacked as a military objective.
While the Tallinn Manual provides a good starting place, in
that it specifically refers to dual-use objectives, gives a general rule
on how they should be treated, and discusses a few pertinent
are quite subjective. It is indeed understandable that in some war situations,
deciding if an attack will or will not have an excessive damage, might be an
extremely complicated task. Especially if we consider that the balance between
excessive collateral damage and military advantage, is very thin and extremely
subjective.”). The proportionality analysis for a cyber-attack has the potential to
be much more complicated that the proportionality analysis to be done for a
traditional kinetic attack. See Jensen, Unexpected Consequences, supra note 96, at
1158–59 (“When using kinetic weapons, determining, at least in the short term,
what injury and damage will occur can be much clearer. This may not be so clear
in relation to CNA.”).
104 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 29, at 445.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 446.
107 Id.
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examples, it does not go far enough in its discussion of how to treat
dual-use objects. It still leaves the military commander with a very
difficult proportionality assessment to make.
How is the
commander to determine what the knock-on effects108 of a cyberattack will be? How can the expected damage to be caused be
estimated, especially when the commander may not have extensive
experience in the cyber context, or have extensive examples of
cyber-attacks and their potential destruction to draw on?
5.1.3. A More Explicit Regulation of Targeting and an Updated
Proportionality Standard
A more explicit regulation is needed for the proportionality
analysis to be undertaken in the event of an attack on a dual-use
objective, a regulation that takes away some of the uncertainty and
human error inherent in the proportionality analysis.109 This
proportionality analysis must explicitly direct the commander to
take into account both direct effects of the attack, as well as knockon effects that could possibly occur.110
In allowing the standard to be inclusive of knock-on effects in
an age of cyberwarfare, where the effects may be more difficult to
predict, the wording of the proportionality principle must also be
changed so that it limits an attack which risks causing collateral
damage, rather than its current regulation against an attack which

Knock-on effects refer to secondary or indirect effects.
See Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 163
(2011) (“For critics and defenders alike, it is evident that the application of the
principle of proportionality is highly contingent on interpretation, context, and
ultimately, the development of a sub-codex of rules for particular
circumstances.”).
110
The inclusion of indirect effects is discussed and adopted in the Tallinn
Manual, but the calculation of how they should work alongside direct effects, or
how a military commander should calculate them is not discussed. TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 29, at 472. In discussing precautions a commander must
take to reduce collateral damage, the Tallinn manual states that, “the issue of
indirect effects is central to cyber operations because of the interconnectivity of
cyber infrastructure, particularly between military and civilian systems.” Id. at
480.
108
109
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“may be expected” to cause collateral damage.111 In this way it will
be more inclusive of harder to predict knock-on effects, and will
direct a commander to more deeply examine the wide range of
potential knock-on effects that could be present in the event of a
cyber-attack.
A commander must also be able to properly differentiate
between different types of knock-on effects and weigh them
accordingly based on the likelihood of occurrence. Collateral
damage that is directly expected as a result of a cyber-attack
should be evaluated differently than knock-on effects which are
fairly unlikely to occur, but which could potentially occur. In
accordance with this comparison, knock-on effects should be
classified into three different categories: (1) knock-on effects likely
to occur, (2) knock-on effects that could reasonably occur, and (3)
knock-on effects which could potentially occur. These should be
differentiated from direct effects and collateral damage anticipated.
The greatest weight in the proportionality equation, after direct
effects and collateral damage anticipated, should be given to those
knock-on effects which are likely to occur, followed by knock-on
effects that could reasonably occur, and then lastly knock-on effects
which could potentially occur. Each commander must be forced to
do the proper assessment taking into account each of these
categories before an attack can be ordered.
The collateral damage and potential harm to civilians (the
combination of the direct effects and the various categories of
knock-on effects) must then be weighed against the concrete and
direct military advantage expected. Unlike the calculation of
potential collateral damage, which must include collateral damage
that may potentially occur but might be unlikely to occur, the
calculation of military advantage should be based only on a
concrete and direct advantage anticipated. It should not take into
111
The “risks causing” standard was contemplated by several states in
drafting Additional Protocol I. See ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I, supra note
84, at 2209 (“Some would have preferred the words ‘which risks causing’ rather
than ‘which may be expected to cause’.”). The new proportionality principle, as
expressed in Article 51(5)(b) would then be a prohibition on “an attack which
risks causing incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” See id.; Additional Protocol I,
supra note 14, art. 51(5)(b).
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account potential advantages that could possibly be gained but
that are unlikely.
Therefore, the specific proportionality analysis to be done in
the context of an attack on a dual-use object in cyberwarfare,
would be a balancing on one side of direct effects, likely knock-on
effects, reasonably possible knock-on effects, and potential knockon effects, against direct and concrete military advantage. For
example,
the
equation
could
be
expressed
as:
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 4 ∗
(𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) + 3 ∗
(𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟) + 2 ∗
(𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟) +
(𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟). The estimate of
direct collateral damage would be multiplied by four, the knock-on
effects likely to occur would be multiplied by three, the knock-on
effects that could reasonably occur would be multiplied by two,
and finally the knock-on effects that could potentially occur would
be multiplied by one. This would demonstrate the relative
importance of each category. These figures would then be added
together. If the left side of the equation outweighs the right side of
the equation, the attack would be permissible since the concrete
and direct advantaged anticipated would be greater than the
potential collateral damage. If the right side of the equation
outweighs the left side of the equation, the attack would be
rendered impermissible.
Consider, for example, a cyber-attack on the computers of air
traffic control center A in an effort to take down a specific
airplane.112 The concrete and direct advantage anticipated would
be causing the specific airplane that has been identified as a
military object (perhaps it is carrying weapons or enemy soldiers)
to crash. The direct collateral damage anticipated might be
whatever damage the airplane would cause when it crashes. The
knock-on effects likely to occur might be damage caused to other
airplanes that are controlled by the same air traffic control center.
Knock-on effects that could reasonably occur would be damage to
112
A cyber-attack on an air traffic control center is certainly not a far-flung
hypothetical. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-221, INFORMATION
SECURITY: FAA NEEDS TO ADDRESS WEAKNESSES IN AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
(2015).
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airplanes controlled by other air traffic control centers, but which
might be affected by the airplanes controlled by air traffic control
center A. Knock-on effects that could potentially occur, would be
those effects generally resulting from decreased use and efficiency
of the airspace in the region of control center A. The commander
would then weigh and compare the direct and concrete military
advantage obtainable through the attack, against the direct
collateral damage and knock-on effects. The same exercise could
be done for a cyber-attack that doesn’t cause any direct physical
damage, but only causes physical damage as a knock-on effect.
For a less hypothetical example, it is useful to consider the
Stuxnet virus.113 Recall that Stuxnet was a joint American/Israeli
project, created in an effort to disrupt the Iranian nuclear program.
While many would declare Stuxnet a success—in that by many
estimates it set the Iranian nuclear program back by one and half to
two years—it did have unintended consequences and eventually
led to the infection of over 100,000 computers worldwide. Looking
at the new, more explicit proportionality equation stated above, the
left side of the equation would consist of the concrete and direct
advantage anticipated. This would be the disruption of the Iranian
nuclear program. The right side of the equation would consist of
the various levels of potential knock-on effects, as well as the direct
collateral damage anticipated. The damage to the facility would
fall into the category of direct collateral damage anticipated.
However, In the case of the Stuxnet, the knock-on effects reached a
very wide and dispersed audience, due to an engineer who took
his computer home with him and then ended up infecting over
100,000 computers worldwide. It seems likely that the virus might
spread to other computers in Iran, which it did at a high rate. The
infections in Iran would fall into the category of knock-on effects
likely to occur. Yet it seems much less likely that the virus would
spread to computers in Bahrain, Ecuador, and Singapore—which it
also did. These infections would fall into the category of knock-on
effects that could potentially occur. If the commanders who
ordered the Stuxnet attack had followed the updated, more explicit
proportionality test proposed by this Comment, they would have
had to take into account the wide range of collateral damage and
113

See supra Section 3.4.
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knock-on effects that the attack risked causing, weighted them
properly, and then balanced them against the concrete and direct
advantage anticipated. If the direct and concrete advantage
anticipated outweighed the direct collateral damage and the
knock-on effects, the attack would be permissible. If not, the attack
would be impermissible.
The practical result that this updated proportionality principle
should have is to diminish the number of cyber-attacks that can be
taken against dual-use objects, as well as to require that a
commander do an extremely thorough analysis before ordering an
attack. The updated proportionality standard will have a higher
likelihood of resulting in no attack being ordered. The detailed
equation and categorization should force commanders to consider
all potential damage and require them to be especially diligent in
accounting for knock-on effects, which are very prevalent in the
cyber context.
There are two related counter arguments to the updated
proportionality principle as I have expressed it. The first would be
that commanders are neither skilled enough nor tech-savvy
enough to accurately give numerical weight to the different types
of knock-on effects. One solution to this problem would be, as will
be discussed further in Section 5.2, to mandate that every cyberattack be approved by a panel made up of (1) a lawyer, (2) a
military commander, and (3) a cyber expert. Another possibility
would be to mandate the creation of a detailed manual, expressing
what weight should be given to different potential knock-on
effects. The manual would give extensive examples of cyberattacks and the effects they could create. It would be written by a
group of international experts, similar to the group that wrote the
Tallinn Manual. In order to effectively balance the proportionality
equation, the commander would only have to insert the types of
relevant effects and their weights. The second counter argument
would be that due to the difficulty of cyber-attacks passing the
proportionality threshold, commanders would revert to ordering
traditional kinetic attacks at a higher rate. There are two responses
to this counterargument. First, if the commander has succeeded in
accurately balancing both sides of the proportionality equation,
and the cyber-attack doesn’t pass, he should not order the cyberattack. This does not mean that he can immediately order a kinetic
attack. The kinetic attack will have to pass the proportionality
analysis as well. If, however, the cyber-attack doesn’t pass the
proportionality assessment because the commander is unsure of
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how to weigh each effect, and he therefore chooses to resort to a
more familiar kinetic attack, this is the type of problem the panel
and the detailed manual are intended to solve. If a commander can
rely on the manual to appropriately weigh direct effects and
knock-on effects, he should be expected to reach an answer
regarding whether the objective can be targeted by performing the
proportionality analysis.
5.2. Taking Precautions When Attacking a Target: Correcting the
Imbalance
The current precautions that commanders must take before
launching a cyber-attack, as well as the ongoing precautions they
must take during the course of an attack, are unfit for modern
cyberwarfare and have the potential to hold more technologicallyadvanced states—or states who invest heavily in military
technology—to an unfairly high standard when compared to states
that are less technologically-advanced or choose not to invest in
cyber capabilities. While this is problematic even in traditional
kinetic warfare,114 the damage it causes is exacerbated in the much
more technologically-advanced cyber context.
The current
regulations also give too much decision-making power to military
commanders who may or may not be technologically proficient or
have a sufficient understanding of cyber weapons or cyberwarfare.
The relevant legal structure must be revised to hold all nations to a
minimum standard of conduct, as well as to ensure that
commanders and decision makers have the qualifications and
information necessary to make important decisions in the cyber
context.

114
For an in-depth discussion of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
(CDRs) in a non-cyber context, see Blum, supra note 109. Blum specifically
discusses both the compliance with the proportionality principle, as well as
precautions to be taken before launching an attack and during the course of the
attack, as examples of standards that could be interpreted as putting unequal
weight on different actors. Blum also analogizes to International Environmental
Law and International Trade law as areas where differential standards are
becoming widely accepted.
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5.2.1. A Problematically Differentiated Standard
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
mandates certain precautions that commanders must take both
before ordering an attack, as well as during the course of an attack.
Those who plan or decide upon an attack (presumably military
commanders) must do everything feasible to verify that an objective
is military and not civilian and take all feasible precautions
regarding the means and methods of attack to minimize collateral
damage. Additionally, they must cancel an attack that is already
underway if they realize that they are attacking a civilian objective
or if they believe that the attack will fail the proportionality test.115
115
Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 57(2)(a)(i–iii). Different states
have unique definitions for how the word “feasible” should be interpreted.
Canada’s Use of Force Manual states that, “‘Feasible’ is understood as that which
is practicable or practicably possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling
at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations. Planners and
commanders are expected to act reasonably and in good faith. Decisions
concerning the use of force shall be reached on the basis of an assessment of the
information reasonably available at the relevant time and that such decisions
cannot be judged on the basis of information which has subsequently come to
light. Reasonable, good faith efforts must be made to gather intelligence and to
review the available intelligence. This standard is one of ‘reasonableness’, not
‘perfection’. The test for determining whether the required standard of care has
been met is an objective one: ‘Did the commander, planner or staff officer do what
a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances?’” DEP’T OF NAT.
DEFENCE (CAN.), CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF, B-GJ-005-501/FP-001, USE OF FORCE
FOR CF OPERATIONS §112.6 (2008). Australia’s Defence Force Manual defines
feasible as “precautions which are practicable or practically possible taking into
account all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military
considerations.” AUSTL. DEFENCE FORCE, OPERATIONS SERIES, ADFP 37, MANUAL ON
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (1994). Leading up to the signing Additional Protocol I,
the United Kingdom stated that, “the word ‘feasible’ means that which is
practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances at the
time including those relevant to the success of military operations.” United
Kingdom, Reservations and declarations made upon ratification of the 1977
Additional Protocol I, 28 Jan. 1998. The commentary to Additional Protocol I
states that the UK’s definition is too broad by including considerations “relevant
to the success of military operations,” but it stated that the “interpretation will be
a matter of common sense and good faith.” ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I,
supra note 84, at 681–82. The United Kingdom eventually conceded to the
adoption of the ICRC’s standard. In the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the feasibility requirement stated that “A military
commander must set up an effective intelligence gathering system to collect and
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Finally, they are required to take feasible precautions in choosing a
means and method of attack to minimize collateral damage. The
feasibility requirement of Article 57 requires commanders to
display a certain specified conduct rather than achieve a particular
result.116 Based on the information at their disposal, they must do
everything feasible to verify the status of an object, decide on the
means of attack, and ensure that the attack is lawful while it is
occurring, as well as that circumstances haven’t changed which
would necessitate canceling the attack.117
The information
available to a commander in making these decisions is dependent
upon the technology and information-gathering capabilities he is
provided with.118 Presumably, the more information available to a
commander, and the better quality the information is, the better he
can comply with his legal obligations. Since Article 57 is conduct-

evaluate information concerning potential targets. The commander must also
direct his forces to use available technical means to properly identify targets
during operations.” ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established
to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
para. 29.
116
The reliance on a conduct standard is in stark contrast to “[m]any IHL
norms [which] are articulated in absolute terms: the intentional killing of civilians
is always a war crime, the use of chemical and biological weapons is absolutely
prohibited, the torture of prisoners of war or civilians is never lawful, and the
carrying out of attacks while posing as a civilian is illegal perfidy.” Blum, supra
note 109, at 186.
117
In today’s interconnected world, an unprecedented amount of
information is available, and this information can be “gathered, assessed and
disseminated remotely at a very fast rate.” Kimberly Trapp, Great Resources Mean
Great Responsibility: A Framework of Analysis for Assessing Compliance with API
Obligations in the Information Age, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE
CHANGING TECHNOLOGY OF WAR 153, 154 (Dan Saxon ed., 2013).
118 Id. at 164; see Jen-Francois Queguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing
the Conduct of Hostilities, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793, 797 (2006),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/irrc_864_queguiner.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RZR9-5NZN] (“The obligation to verify the nature of the
objective to be attacked obviously requires that close attention be paid to the
gathering, assessment and rapid circulation of information on potential targets.
These activities are naturally dependent on the availability and quality of the
belligerents’ technical resources.”); see also Beard, supra note 3, at 106 (“To the
extent that feasibility relates to making an ‘informed decision’ in this context, it
will focus on what cyber intelligence-gathering operations must or can be
conducted in order to make that informed decision.”).
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based and not result-based,119 compliance with Article 57 is
determined based on the process followed and not the result
achieved. Presumably, a commander who took all feasible
precautions before launching a cyber-attack would not be found to
be in violation of Article 57, even if the attack ended up causing
tremendous collateral damage.120 On the other hand, a commander
who caused very little collateral damage, but did not take all
feasible precautions could be found to have violated Article 57.
Similarly, since it is widely agreed upon that cyber weapons have
the ability to be more precise than traditional kinetic weapons and
therefore cause less collateral damage121—and Article 57 calls on
commanders to use the means and methods of attack which will
cause the least collateral damage—it would seem that once a
country developed a precise, technologically-advanced cyber
weapon, it would be limited to using this weapon over other
kinetic weapons which might be less precise and cause more
collateral damage.122
119 See also Trapp, supra note 117, at 155 (“The distinction between obligations
of conduct and obligations of result is derived from the Civil Law tradition and
turns on an analysis of whether the primary rule requires absolutely that State
conduct produce a certain result (obligation of result), or whether it requires only
that a State make certain efforts to produce a desired, but uncertain, result
(obligation of conduct).”).
120 See generally Queguiner, supra note 118, at 810 (“The basic challenge raised
by the expression ‘feasible’ is in determining whether, and to what extent, it can
be interpreted as legitimizing mistakes. For example, information sought and
gathered in good faith may lead a party to believe that an object is a military
objective, while in fact it is entirely civilian in nature.”).
121 See DINNISS, supra note 2, at 183; Jensen, Unexpected Consequences, supra
note 96, at 1168 (2003) (“CNA [Computer Network Attack] provides a relatively
bloodless means of attack compared to traditional means of force.”)
122 See Jensen, Unexpected Consequences, supra note 96, at 1169 (2003) (“Once
the commander has shown the capability to limit the use of kinetic force by
advanced weapons technology, some will say that he is now required under
humanitarian law to exercise that option in every case.”); Queguiner, supra note
118, at 802 (“It has also been argued that imposing an obligation to use the most
precise weaponry possible would have the perverse effect of slowing the
development of sophisticated and expensive weapon systems. By avoiding the
development of advanced systems, a party could lawfully use weapons that are
less precise and much cheaper, thereby lowering its precision standards when
applying the proportionality principle.”); Eric Jaworski, “Military Necessity” and
“Civilian Immunity”: Where is the Balance?, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 175, 201 (“A strong
requirement of using the best possible technology may actually create a world
where some nations are held to a higher standard of care regarding the rule of
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Based on the current structure of Article 57, a state with
significant intelligence-gathering capabilities and advanced
technology in the cyber realm will be held to a much higher result
standard than a country will lesser capabilities.123 A state that
invests billions of dollars in technologically-advanced intelligence
gathering capabilities, and other cyber capabilities, will be
expected to use those resources to ensure that their actions are
lawful and minimize collateral damage, while a state who chooses
not to make these investments will be held to a much lower
standard and will be given more leeway to launch attacks that
don’t completely verify that the target is a military objective and
that collateral damage will be minimized, or to launch attacks
using a means or method that causes more extensive collateral
The conduct expected of a commander in a
damage.124
technologically-advanced state necessary to comply with Article 57
will be much higher than the conduct expected from a commander
This seems to
in a less technologically-advanced state.125
proportionality than others based solely on the higher level of technology at their
disposal.”); DINNISS, supra note 2, at 213 (“Ironically, the requirement for an
attacker to take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
warfare may require that states that have the ability to launch computer network
attacks to use that ability in preference to more traditional means.”).
123
6 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE
REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 228 (1977) (”[Article 57] will apply in accordance
with the limits of capability, practical possibility and feasibility of each Party to
the conflict.”). Gabriella Blum discusses this problem in a non-cyber context
saying, “[c]apabilities raise expectations: the greater intelligence and precision
capabilities a military possesses, the greater expectation that it will use them to
avoid civilian harm.” Blum, supra note 109, at 194.
124
Trapp, supra note 117, at 166 (“The less technologically advanced a State
Party to an armed conflict, the more discretion military commanders will have in
deploying particular resources to gather relevant precautionary measure
information.”). The commentary to Additional Protocol I noted that a Party with
technological capabilities must use them, stating that “it is reprehensible for a
Party possessing such means not to use them.” ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL
I, supra note 84, at 600. Discussing this asymmetry, the commentary notes, “one
delegation remarked that the identification of objectives depended to a large
extent on the technical means of detection available to the belligerents. This
remark seems to be correct. For example, some belligerents might have
information owing to a modern reconnaissance device, while other belligerents
might not have this type of equipment.” Id. at 682.
125
This would apply to various provisions of Article 57. Presumably a
commander in a more technologically-advanced nation would have better access
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incentivize a race to the bottom, and disincentivize technological
advancement. A party who chooses not to invest in developing
technological capabilities would not be shackled and constricted in
the same manner as a party that does not. We should avoid
“disincentivizing” states from developing cyber capabilities in this
manner.
5.2.2. Attempts by the Tallinn Manual Experts to Regulate
Necessary Precautions
The Tallinn Manual discusses the application of Article 57 in
the cyber context, although it does not discuss the potential race to
the bottom or the inequality between technologically-advanced
states and less technologically-advanced states. The experts break
Article 57 into a number of different rules including: (1) Rule 114:
Constant Care,126 (2) Rule 115: Verification of Targets,127 (3) Rule
116: Choice of Means or Methods,128 (4) Rule 117: Precautions as to
Proportionality,129 (5) Rule 118: Choice of Targets,130 (6) Rule 119:
to information to help him determine from the outset whether an object is a
military objective, he will have more precise means of attack to help him minimize
collateral damage, and he will have better access to incoming information as the
attack develops which will help him decide whether to cancel or suspend the
attack if he realizes it will not pass the proportionality analysis.
126
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 29, at 476 (“During hostilities involving
cyber operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population,
individual civilians, and civilian objects.”).
127 Id. at 478 (“Those who plan or decide upon a cyber-attack shall do
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians
nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection.”).
128 Id. at 479–80 (“Those who plan or decide upon a cyber-attack shall take all
feasible precautions in the choice of means or methods of warfare employed in
such an attack, with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental injury to civilians, loss of civilian life, and damage to or destruction of
civilian objects.”).
129 Id. at 481 (“Those who plan or decide upon attacks shall refrain from
deciding to launch any cyber-attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.”).
130 Id. at 481 (“For States Parties to Additional Protocol I, when a choice is
possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military
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Cancellation or Suspension of Attack,131 (7) Rule 120: Warnings,132
and (8) Rule 121: Precautions Against the Effects of Cyber
Attacks.133 Importantly, the Tallinn Manual discusses the word
“feasible” in the cyber context as “that which is practicable or
practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at
the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”134
The Tallinn Manual also lists examples of what taking feasible
precautions might look like in the cyber context.135 Importantly,
the Tallinn Manual states that “there is no obligation to take
measures that are not feasible.”136
5.2.3. Revising Article 57 and Necessary Precautions
There are a few ways that this problem of misaligned
incentives and the potential race to the bottom that is created by
advantage, the objective to be selected for cyber-attack shall be that the attack on
which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian
objects.”). The experts involved in writing the Tallinn Manual could not come to a
consensus as to whether this rule (which is based on Article 57(3) of Additional
Protocol I), had become part of customary international law and therefore applies
to states who are not party to Additional Protocol I. A majority of the experts
thought that it had become customary international law. Id. at 482.
131
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 29, at 483 (“Those who plan, approve, or
execute a cyber-attack shall cancel or suspend the attack if it becomes apparent
that: (a) the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection; or (b)
the attack may be expected to cause, directly or indirectly, incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof
that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”).
132 Id. at 484 (“effective advance warning shall be given of cyber-attacks that
may affect the civilian population unless circumstances do not permit.”).
133 Id. at 487 (“The parties to an armed conflict shall, to the maximum extent
feasible, take necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual
civilians, and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting
from cyber-attacks.”).
134 Id. at 479 (quoting the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996).
135
Id. (examples include “gathering intelligence on the networks through
mapping or other processes in order to allow those responsible reasonably to
determine the attacks likely effects, particularly on the civilian population or
civilian objects.”).
136 Id.
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Article 57, could be solved. First, Article 57 could be revised to
institute a minimum standard of care that every commander must
abide by when taking precautions before launching an attack and
during an attack. This would ensure that states investing in
technology and cyber capabilities are not punished for their
decision to invest as all states would be held to a higher standard.
It might also serve to encourage less technologically-advanced
states to invest in cyber capabilities. One way to institute this
minimum standard would be to introduce a detailed check list of
specific tasks that need to be completed by a commander before an
attack is launched and in order to monitor an attack while it is
occurring. This list of specific tasks would be the same for all
states, regardless of their level of technological advancement.
A second solution would be to replace the word “feasible” with
a stronger adjective that would not be dependent upon the
resources of the specific country. Perhaps, mandating that a
commander take all “necessary” precautions in the choice of means
and methods of attack and do everything “necessary” to verify that
objectives to be attacked are military and not civilian, would take
the subjectivity out of the standard.137 It is important to note that
“necessary” was the specific adjective used in the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia case of Prosecutor v.
Tadic.138
Finally, changing the standard from a conduct-based standard
to a results-based standard would help prevent the
If the
disincentivizing of technological advancement.139

137
The relevant portions of Article 57 would then read that (1) a commander
must do everything necessary to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither
civilians nor civilian objects and (2) that commanders must take all necessary
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack.
138
”In the conduct of military operations . . . all necessary precautions
should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to civilian populations.”
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 111 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former
Yugoslavia
Oct.
2,
1995),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm
[https://perma.cc/65T9-K3NJ].
139
A move to a result-based test would more closely mirror the rest of
international humanitarian law. See Blum, supra note 109, at 165 (“Some
exceptions notwithstanding, IHL obligations bind all parties equally, regardless of
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“feasibility” requirement was replaced by a specific result
requirement (perhaps mirroring the proportionality requirement,
stating that precautions must be taken to ensure that collateral
damage is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated), states would not be held to a
lower standard for not developing cyber capabilities.
5.2.4. Ensuring Capable Decision Makers
In addition to updating Article 57 to remove the potential raceto-the-bottom problem, Article 57 must be revised to require states
to ensure that the people tasked with making decisions and
carrying out attacks are, pursuant to Article 57, capable of making
decisions relevant to a cyberwarfare scenario. Commanders
making decisions regarding Article 57 precautions are held to a
standard of reasonableness regarding their assessment of the
targetable status of an object and whether or not an attack will pass
the proportionality requirement.140
Reasonableness is an
overbroad standard that must be defined more specifically.
One way to remedy this deficiency would be to mandate that
the “reasonable” commander or decision maker have familiarity
with technology and cyberwar capabilities and problems.
Commanders who are trained in kinetic warfare and have
extensive knowledge and experience in kinetic warfare aren’t
necessarily equipped to order and evaluate more technologicallyadvanced cyber-attacks.
Commanders who have less cyber
knowledge and experience should be required to consult more
closely with advisors and reports that can help inform them and fill
the information gap.
A second way to ensure that commanders are able to make
intelligent and legal targeting decisions would be to require every
cyber-attack to be approved by a panel comprised of a lawyer, a
cyber expert, and a military commander. This would ensure that
the attack is approved by people with sufficient knowledge and
the type of way they fight, the justness of their respective causes, or the disparities
in power and capabilities between them.”).
140 See Trapp, supra note 117, at 164.
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expertise to determine that the necessary precautions have been
taken and that the attack will be legal.
6. CONCLUSION
Modern warfare is rapidly becoming more technologicallyadvanced and cyber-attacks are becoming the norm, rather than
the exception.
Dozens of countries have developed cyber
capabilities, and many states have begun to heavily invest in cyber
weapons and cyber defense. Although many scholars argue that
an entirely new system of international humanitarian law is
needed to effectively regulate cyberwarfare, it is this Comment’s
belief that an updated version of the current international law,
namely Additional Protocol I, is sufficient. The Tallinn Manual has
made a good start, but it has not gone far enough. Specifically, in
the law of targeting, two important updates must be made.
First, the law of targeting must be updated to take into account
the targeting of dual-use objectives. While dual-use objectives are
present in traditional kinetic warfare, they are far more prevalent
in cyberwarfare, and the civilian and military parts of the objective
are more difficult to separate. In order to effectively regulate the
targeting of dual-use objectives, the traditional proportionality
principle, found in Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I must be
updated. It must first expand its ability to include hard-to-predict
knock-on effects by substituting the “expected to cause” standard
with a “risk of causing” standard. The new standard would then
prohibit “an attack which may risk causing incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” In addition to
this change, an explicit equation must be added to the
proportionality principle which requires commanders to take into
account and properly weigh not only direct collateral damage, but
also likely knock-on effects, reasonably possible knock-on effects,
and potential knock-on effects. These must then be weighed
against the direct and concrete military advantage that an attack
would produce. In making this assessment, the commander would
be required to consult with a panel which would include himself, a
lawyer, and a cyber expert.
Second, the precautions a commander must take before
ordering an attack, after an attack has begun, and in choosing the
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means and method of attack, must be updated. The current
standard risks penalizing states for technological innovation, for
developing more precise cyber weapons, and for developing
enhanced intelligence gathering means to determine whether an
objective is military or civilian. There are a few possible ways to
revise this standard. First, Article 57 could be revised to institute a
minimum standard of care that commanders must meet when
taking precautions for an attack. This minimum standard would
be the same for all states. Second, the word “feasible” in Article 57
could be replaced with the word “necessary” — revising the
relevant standard so that commanders must “do everything
necessary to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither
civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special
protection but are military objectives” and “take all necessary
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a
view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”
Finally, the precautions standard could be improved by changing it
from a conduct standard to a result standard and mandating a
specific result.
Overall, the result of these revisions would be to update
international humanitarian law to specifically take into account the
interconnectedness of cyberspace and the dangers posed by a
world of military commanders inexperienced in cyberwarfare.
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